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Quist, John and Birkner, Michael. James Buchanan and the Coming of the
Civil War. University Press of Florida, $69.95 ISBN 978-0-8130-4426-2
Challenging the Traditional View of Buchanan
James Buchanan is usually ranked in the lowest tier of presidents by
historians and political scientists who care about those types of things. Most
Americans probably could not recall anything about him, and if they did, it
would likely only be his role in the secession crisis of 1860-61.
But there is more to Buchanan than just the secession crisis, and even that
period of his administration is little understood by non-Civil War experts. John
Quist and Michael Birkner’s co-edited volume of essays attempts to provide a
more comprehensive, better balanced assessment of Buchanan’s presidency.
After the book’s introduction places Buchanan in historiographical context and
explains the origins of the volume, the ten contributors address both well-known
episodes and themes, as well as those that have not received as much attention
by the scholarly community. The result is a portrait of the fifteenth president that
acknowledges his weaknesses and shortcomings, yet also recognizes that his
failures were not universal.
William P. MacKinnon and John M. Belohlavek address two overlooked
topics among most historians: Buchanan’s relations with the Mormons and his
foreign policy. MacKinnon makes it clear that not all of Buchanan’s decisions
regarding the Mormons were poorly made, yet the bad certainly seems to
outweigh the good. He failed to inform Utah’s territorial governor (and Mormon
leader) Brigham Young, for example, that Alfred Cumming was replacing him,
even though the media were already reporting the news. This delay allowed
Young to prepare Mormons to push back against the military force that
Buchanan sent to ensure a peaceful transition. Buchanan’s actions during the
Mormon War also encouraged criticism from both Mormons and Republicans
that the president was using the crisis to line the pockets of his supporters,
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including Secretary of War John B. Floyd. The taint of corruption only added to
the perception that Buchanan lacked leadership. Belohlavek takes a more
positive view of Buchanan’s foreign policy decisions, arguing that “his policies,
actions, and sound judgment often benefited the nation" and even his failures
“reflected a genuine and realistic concern for American security and commercial
goals that would be pursued by later administrations" (112). For example, even
though he supported slavery’s expansion, Buchanan tried to eliminate the
filibustering missions that threatened to destabilize Latin American nations and
harm U.S. economic opportunities among them.
Paul Finkelman’s chapter tackles one of the main criticisms of Buchanan:
his unwillingness to allow Congress to regulate slavery in West. Finkelman
focuses on the Dred Scott Supreme Court decision of 1857, and while he does
not believe that a conspiracy existed between the executive and legislative
branches, he does endorse the idea that “the new president corruptly used insider
knowledge to endorse the decision before it was announced" (38). Buchanan’s
deference to the Taney court on the question of slavery’s westward expansion
into U.S. territory “ran counter to the entire political history of the United states
up to that point" (26). Nicole Etcheson argues that while Buchanan’s absence
from the U.S. political scene during the nullification crisis and the Bank War left
him “out of touch . . . With the concerns of a new political generation," he was
not unaware of the slavery issue (90). Buchanan served as James K. Polk’s
secretary of state during the Mexican-American War and had endorsed applying
the Missouri Compromise line to the territory that the U.S. gained from Mexico
via the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. When Democrats nominated him in 1856,
however, Buchanan was forced to support the idea of popular sovereignty
regarding slavery in the territories, even though it was not his preferred course of
action. His insistence that the North, not the South, was the threat to national
unity only poisoned the political water and provided a precedent against which
antislavery northerners judged his later actions during the secession crisis.
Michael A. Morrison’s examination of Buchanan’s leadership echoes Etcheson’s
in some ways. He argues that Buchanan thought primarily in partisan terms. This
determination failed to account for the sectional rancor that was consuming the
nation, and it also added to the perception of corruption within the Democratic
party.
The later chapters by Jean H. Baker, William G. Shade, and Daniel W.
Crofts primarily address the secession crisis. Instead of representing the interests
of the entire Union, Baker believes that Buchanan was influenced significantly
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by pro-southern advisors, including cabinet members, who confirmed his own
pro-southern sympathies. He was, in her words, “the most dangerous of chief
executives: a stubborn mistaken ideologue whose principles held no room for
compromise" (181). Some historians might disagree with Shade’s claim that the
northern public “did not have a good idea of what was happening" and northern
politicians “did not grasp the gravity of the situation," but he provides a helpful
overview of the different northern perspectives on the secession crisis through
the views of Buchanan, Abraham Lincoln, Stephen A. Douglas, William H.
Seward, and Thaddeus Stevens (194). Crofts uses Joseph J. Holt, Buchanan’s
former postmaster general who assumed the secretary of war position between
January and March 1861, to argue that Holt’s response to the secession crisis,
which historians generally applaud, closely paralleled that of his oft-criticized
chief" (209). He credits both Holt and Buchanan for trying to avoid war. In fact,
Crofts suggests that “[o]n the whole, Buchanan made as capable an effort to
accomplish the impossible as Lincoln did during the latter’s first month-plus in
office" (230).
In addition to a sympathetic epilogue by Birkner, also included is an edited
exchange between William W. Freehling and Michael F. Holt from the
conference that spawned the volume. This conversation alone is worth picking
up the book. One example from each historian gives a sense of their respective
views. Holt reminded audience members that up until that point, Congress had
used political compromises to solve issues that threatened the Union, a fact on
which Buchanan was depending. The reality, though, according to Holt, was that
some southern states were unwilling to recognize Lincoln’s election. This “was
not a congressional problem, it was something else" (255). In responding to an
audience member’s question about the economic influence on the coming of the
Civil War, Freehling argued that separating slavery from economics was
impossible because “[t]he continuation of slavery was, among other things, the
nation’s most important economic issue" (257).
As someone who teaches courses on both the Civil War and the American
presidency, I found these essays very useful in refining my view of Buchanan. I
am still not sure that he does not belong in the lowest tier of presidents, but the
contributors may have finally convinced me that he ranks higher than U.S.
Grant.
Mark R. Cheathem is an associate professor of history at Cumberland
University and the author of the forthcoming Andrew Jackson, Southerner. He
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blogs at jacksonianamerica.com.
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